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The Supreme Court is entering a new era, discarding long-standing legal doctrines to
reshape the relationship between the states and the federal government. Paralleling trends
in the legislative and executive branches of government, the Court is constructing its own
version of devolution. Through a reinterpretation of the Commerce Clause of the Con-
stitution, which is the anchor for many of our civil rights and social welfare laws, the Court
has severely curtailed the power of the federal government to enact progressive legislation.
This article provides an overview of this new judicial doctrine and discusses its implications
for social welfare policy.
Much of what we do as social workers is mediated through the law,
whether through the web of legislation that establishes social services
programs or the equally important maze of laws designed to protect
the rights of traditionally disenfranchised groups. While the legislative
process is familiar terrain for many social workers, less familiar are the
workings of the extremely powerful United States Supreme Court. The
institution is of particular contemporary concern because recent Su-
preme Court rulings indicate a disturbing change in the Court’s ap-
proach to federal civil rights and other legislation. This “radical exper-
iment in judicial activism” (Kramer 2000, p. 290), based on an alternative
vision of the proper relationship between the states and the national
government, undermines some gains in the civil rights arena and casts
doubt on the enactment of progressive federal legislation in the future.
Starting in the mid-1990s and accelerating during the Supreme
Court’s 1999 term, certain legal doctrines, thought discredited after a
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string of Supreme Court decisions upholding the New Deal legislation
of the 1930s, have been resurrected by the Court to invalidate federal
legislation designed to address social problems. Understanding this re-
cent trend requires knowledge of often complex constitutional law.
While equal protection and due process of law are terms familiar to
social workers and others outside the legal profession, a clause in the
Constitution that permits the federal government to regulate interstate
commerce (the Commerce Clause) underlies many of the laws that
protect civil rights and advance the public’s welfare. A reinterpretation
of the Commerce Clause is at the center of the Supreme Court’s recent
decisions.
A watershed case, United States v. Morrison (2000), illustrates this re-
interpretation. In Morrison, the Supreme Court struck down a provision
of the Violence against Women Act (1994; VAW Act), a federal law that
provided an arsenal of remedies to address gender-based violence and
that many considered an essential civil rights law for women. The case
before the Court involved a young college student who had been gang-
raped in her dormitory by fellow students and then verbally harassed
and threatened. The newly enacted VAW Act provided a remedy for the
victim that she did not have before: the right to file a civil suit for
damages against her attackers in federal court. But the Court invalidated
this remedy under the Commerce Clause. (Other provisions of the VAW
Act providing for criminal penalties for acts of gender violence were
not affected by this decision.)
The Court’s recent seemingly technical interpretation of the Com-
merce Clause is in fact much more than that. While the Supreme Court
may cloak its decisions in the language of law and precedent, Morrison
and other recent decisions indicate a shift in some ways no less radical
than if the Court had announced that it was overturning Roe v. Wade
or another landmark decision. Although the focus of this article is the
Commerce Clause, the Court has also begun reining in Congress under
other parts of the Constitution, including the Tenth, Eleventh, and
Fourteenth Amendments. Recent decisions have limited the ability of
the federal government to enlist state officials to carry out federal pol-
icies or enforce or apply remedial laws, such as the Fair Labor Standards
Act (1989) or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (1967), to
state governments.1 While these cases follow a different line of consti-
tutional doctrine, they indicate that the Supreme Court is following a
consistent path toward a historical redefinition of the concept of
federalism.
In sum, these decisions are reshaping the concept of federalism, the
structure of American government whereby power is allocated among
the national government, the states, and individual citizens. The Su-
preme Court is signaling its willingness to shift the locus of policy making
away from the federal government by aggressively curtailing federal
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power to legislate in certain areas. Since much progressive legislation
has historically emanated from the federal level, and since the com-
plexity of national life often requires national measures, this change has
serious implications for social welfare policy.
The Supreme Court’s reinterpretation of the Commerce Clause par-
allels changes occurring in other parts of the body politic where the
concept of federalism is undergoing reinterpretation. Congress increas-
ingly uses states rights arguments to grant discretion to state govern-
ments in matters traditionally decided at the federal level. The enact-
ment of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act in 1996, which gave the states unprecedented flex-
ibility in administering public welfare programs for poor families, and
the increasing reliance on block grants as a funding mechanism are
examples of this trend, often referred to as devolution. In addition, the
growing movement toward privatizing certain public functions, such as
child welfare, prisons, and schools, indicates a desire to bypass govern-
ment altogether in favor of permitting the private sector to exert more
control over public policy (Gibelman and Demone 1998). For social
workers and others in the policy arena these changes require new strat-
egies and approaches for promoting social change.
Much has been written about devolution, privatization, and privati-
zation’s effect on social services delivery and public policy (see, e.g.,
Abramovitz 1986; Kamerman and Kahn 1989; Brilliant 1997; Gibelman
and Demone 1998). Less attention has been paid to the role of the
Supreme Court. This article addresses that gap by providing social work-
ers with the knowledge necessary to enter the debate on the judiciary’s
equivalent of devolution—judicial federalism. First, I look at the his-
torical and legal framework underlying federalism, including how the
rules of federalism have been shaped by the Supreme Court through
its interpretation of the Commerce Clause and other constitutional pro-
visions. Next, I examine recent Supreme Court decisions that signal a
fundamental change in federalism jurisprudence, with a particular em-
phasis on Morrison and the VAW Act. Whether the Supreme Court is
the proper institution to reshape federalism will then be explored. Fi-
nally, I discuss the implications of these decisions.
Historical and Legal Framework
Built into the U.S. system of government and contained in the Consti-
tution is the concept of federalism, which is characterized by a cen-
tralized federal government of limited powers existing alongside 50 au-
tonomous state governments. Which level of government—state or
federal—gets to do what is the central question of federalism (Chem-
erinsky 1994). The Constitution provides the framework for answering
this question. Significantly, at its founding the federal government was
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not granted the inherent right to promote the general welfare of its
citizens; its actions must be anchored to a specific power granted to it
in the Constitution (Nowak and Rotunda 1995). These powers, spelled
out in the Constitution, include the powers to regulate commerce be-
tween the states; to tax and spend for the common defense and general
welfare; to borrow money; to establish immigration, naturalization,
bankruptcy, copyright, and patent laws; to coin money; to create a fed-
eral court system; to declare war; to enter into treaties; and to regulate
armies and navies. Of these enumerated powers, the one that comes
closest to granting the federal government a generalized power to pro-
mote the general welfare is the Commerce Clause, “because much of
the activity that takes place within the country, and even within a single
state, might be said to relate to economic issues and problems” (Nowak
and Rotunda 1995, p. 131).2
The power of the states, on the other hand, is described differently.
While the Constitution prohibits states from exercising certain powers,
such as coining money, the Tenth Amendment provides that the state
and the people are the repositories of all powers not delegated or pro-
hibited in the Constitution. This reserve clause is designed to ensure
the sovereignty of the states and to preserve individual rights (Nowak
and Rotunda 1995).
The Constitution, however, provides only the broad strokes for de-
termining the allocation of power. Politics provides the details, as Con-
gress passes specific laws to effectuate its powers. The judicial system,
in turn, decides whether Congress has constitutionally exceeded its au-
thority; judicial decisions can result in either an expansion or dimi-
nution of the federal government’s powers. For most of U.S. history,
the Supreme Court has pursued a flexible and pragmatic approach to
allocating power, expanding the federal government’s power and,
hence, its ability to respond to the complex problems confronting the
nation (Merrill 1998; Kramer 2000). By broadly defining commerce and
widening the scope of other constitutional provisions, the Court laid
the foundation for a strong national government.
The seminal case to address the issue of the scope of federal powers
was McCulloch v. Maryland in 1819. McCulloch concerned an attempt by
the federal government to establish a national bank. The states perceived
the establishment of a national bank that could operate within their
respective jurisdictions as a threat to state sovereignty, and they mounted
a challenge to the law on the basis that it exceeded constitutionally set
limits on power.
The Supreme Court rejected the states’ argument, finding a link be-
tween a national bank and several enumerated powers in the Consti-
tution, including the power to lay and collect taxes, to borrow money,
and to regulate commerce. Significantly, the Court did not require that
the exact power being exercised, here establishing a bank, be explicitly
322 Social Service Review
provided for in the Constitution. Relying on a clause in the Constitution
that grants Congress the power “to make all laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into execution…its powers” (the Necessary and
Proper Clause), the Court determined that Congress need only show
that it is trying to effectuate important national goals connected to its
enumerated powers when enacting legislation (U.S. Const. art. I, sec.
8).
The Supreme Court also interpreted the Commerce Clause broadly
in these early cases. In the landmark case of Gibbons v. Ogden (1824),
which involved a state’s granting of monopoly rights to a private busi-
ness, the Court upheld the power of the federal government to prevent
individual states from granting monopolies, thus recognizing the often
interconnected web of commercial activities among the states and the
ability of Congress to intervene to insure a smooth-running economy.
This expansive view of federal powers held sway for much of the
nineteenth century and allowed the federal government to adapt to
change. At the end of the century, the Supreme Court retreated from
this view. As an economic system based on laissez-faire capitalism col-
lided with the federal government’s attempts to limit its harshest effects,
states rights became a rallying point for those wishing to resist federal
intrusion. The Court began to rein in Congress, relying on the Tenth
Amendment, which (as described above) gave to the states and the
people powers not delegated in the Constitution (Nowak and Rotunda
1995). This reserve power was interpreted by the Court as providing
protection against too much regulation by the federal government.
To restrain Congress, the Supreme Court coupled the Tenth Amend-
ment with a restrictive interpretation of the Commerce Clause that elim-
inated as many activities as possible from the sphere of commerce. It
did this by parsing the word commerce, making a distinction, for example,
between the manufacturing and selling of goods, with the former not
considered part of commerce. On this basis, the Court invalidated sev-
eral progressive federal laws, including the regulation of child labor and
a law protecting union membership, deciding that such activities af-
fected only the making, and not the selling, of goods (Adair v. United
States 1908; Hammer v. Dagenhart 1918). Activities that only indirectly
affected commerce, such as federal laws that made railroads and other
common carriers liable for negligence, were also considered outside the
scope of federal power (The Employers Liability Cases 1908). This inter-
pretation of the Commerce Clause was in sharp contrast to the earlier
view of the Court, cited in Ogden above, which indicated a willingness
to defer to Congress when it came to legislation concerning the
economy.
During this period attempts by Congress to regulate certain conduct
through other provisions of the Constitution also proved futile. Using
the Fourteenth Amendment as its base, Congress attempted to prohibit
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racial discrimination in public places, including theaters, hotels, and
railroad cars, by imposing financial penalties on the owners of such
establishments.3 The Supreme Court thwarted the attempt, holding in
In re Civil Rights Cases (1883) that the Fourteenth Amendment applies
only to governmental, not private, action. Since private persons, not the
government, own theaters, restaurants, and railroad cars, the conduct
of such persons cannot be regulated by the government. This landmark
case, which has never been overturned by the Court, proved to be a
significant hurdle for enacting civil rights legislation. It forced propo-
nents of such legislation to look elsewhere, including the Commerce
Clause, when Congress tried once again, in the 1960s, to enact civil
rights laws.
In 1937, this restrictive view of federal power met its match. After the
Supreme Court invalidated a string of New Deal legislation, including
laws regulating labor relationships and hourly and wage standards, Pres-
ident Franklin Delano Roosevelt proposed his court-packing plan to
appoint several new justices that would tip the Court in his favor (Hof-
stadter 1955). While the plan was defeated by Congress, it had its in-
tended effect. At least one justice shifted his position, and that, coupled
with the appointments of seven new justices over the next 4 years, altered
the ideological composition of the Court (Nowak and Rotunda 1995).
The power of Congress to legislate in the national interest was affirmed,
and Congress was freed from the straightjacket imposed on it by earlier
Court decisions.
The Supreme Court began to fashion a new test for determining the
scope of federal power (Nowak and Rotunda 1995). The Tenth Amend-
ment was no longer construed as limiting that power. The utility of the
Commerce Clause as a basis for Congressional action was restored and
then expanded. The Court ruled that any activity that affected com-
merce, even if it was not commerce itself, could be regulated, thus
eliminating the distinction between manufacturing and commerce and
broadening commerce to include even noncommerce-type activities.
Congress need not even have the regulation of commerce as its purpose
as long as the effect on commerce was substantial. Hence, statutes ad-
dressing “moral and social wrongs” could find a home in the Commerce
Clause alongside laws directed at more traditional economic concerns
(Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States 1967, p. 258). Congress could
even reach into activities occurring within a single state as long those
activities affected commerce outside the state. Finally, Congress, not the
courts, would decide whether a particular activity affected commerce.
The Court was limited to deciding whether Congress’s actions were
rational, the lowest level of scrutiny applied by the Court, signaling that
great deference was afforded to Congress.4
Using this broad test, over the next 50-plus years Congress greatly
expanded the federal government’s role in a range of activities. The
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Supreme Court did not once invalidate legislation on the basis that
Congress had exceeded its powers under the Commerce Clause (Cramer
2000). Laws regulating the more conventional areas that affect com-
merce, including union activities and working conditions, were upheld
by the Court (NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 1937; United States v.
Darby 1941). With the passage of the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act
(1938), requiring the inclusion of certain information about products
on their labels, consumer protection, health, and safety also fell within
the legitimate scope of the Commerce Clause (United States v. Sullivan
1948).
Congress also used the Commerce Clause to reach activities more
usually associated with civil rights than economic rights, enacting the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, which outlawed racial discrimination in public
accommodations. The use of the Commerce Clause in this instance was
a way around earlier Supreme Court decisions, described above, that
prevented Congress from using the Fourteenth Amendment to regulate
conduct among private persons.
The Supreme Court decisions upholding these laws are illustrative of
how willing the Court was to let Congress decide the limits of the clause
and regulate activities that were in any way connected to commerce
between the states. Thus in Katzenbach v. McClung (1964), the Court
affirmed Congress’s ability to extend its reach deep into individual states,
holding that a small family-owned restaurant that never served out-of-
state travelers was nevertheless subject to antidiscrimination laws because
it purchased meat from a local supplier who received it from an out-
of-state source. And in Heart of Atlanta, the Court made clear it would
not second-guess Congress on the proof needed to establish the con-
nection between a regulated activity and commerce. It permitted Con-
gress to rely on anecdotal evidence, and not formalized findings, that
racial discrimination by motels and restaurants affected commerce. In
short, the Court in Katzenbach stated, “The power of the Congress in
this field is broad and sweeping” (p. 305).
With these cases firmly establishing the Commerce Clause as a legit-
imate basis for combating discrimination, the clause came to support a
wide array of civil rights laws, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, which prohibits discrimination in employment; the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act of 1967; and the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act of 1990 (Cramer 2000). The Commerce Clause thus became
an instrument for repairing not only economic problems but also social
problems, as long as Congress could show some connection between
the two. This was not difficult to do because most social problems are
intertwined with economic forces, and because the Supreme Court low-
ered the bar for establishing the relationship between a particular prob-
lem and the national economy.
In sum, except between the end of the nineteenth century and 1937,
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the Supreme Court’s concept of federalism, expressed primarily through
its interpretation of the Commerce Clause, reflected the notion that to
maintain the well-being of the country and its citizens, the tension be-
tween state sovereignty and national power often needed to be resolved
in favor of the latter. Even in the early days of the nation the Court
recognized the unifying force of the federal government and the de-
sirability of permitting Congress to fashion national solutions to national
ills. The Court deviated from this path only during the heyday of laissez-
faire capitalism, bringing on a constitutional crisis that threatened the
institutional integrity of the Court. For nearly 60 years since then, the
Court has recognized the increasing interdependence of modern life
and the need for federal intervention to smooth and shape its course.
As will be described in next section, recent decisions of the Supreme
Court indicate a return to that period when the Court tried to limit
Congress’s activity.
The New Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
The first sign that the Supreme Court was poised to reverse course came
in 1995 in the case of United States v. Lopez. Lopez involved a challenge
to the federally enacted Gun Free School Zones Act (1990), which made
it a federal crime knowingly to possess a firearm in a school zone. The
Court found that there is no connection between illegally possessing a
gun and interstate commerce. It rejected arguments that guns cause
violent crimes that affect economic activity by increasing insurance costs,
by making people hesitant to engage in business in unsafe areas, and
by interfering with the educational process (thereby reducing the pro-
ductivity and efficiency of workers). Lopez has the distinction of being
the first time in 58 years the Court struck down a federal law based on
the Commerce Clause.
With the Lopez decision, the Supreme Court did not expressly overrule
its previous precedents on the Commerce Clause, but it criticized these
earlier cases, indicating that the Court had too easily deferred to Con-
gress’s judgment in the past. The Court found that to continue to do
so would obliterate the “distinction between what is truly national and
what is truly local,” thus allowing the federal government to intrude
into areas traditionally regulated by the state (Lopez, p. 567).
Lopez left the future of the Commerce Clause unclear and legal com-
mentators unsure of the status of Commerce Clause jurisprudence (Kol-
enc 1998; Cramer 2000). A partial answer came in the Supreme Court’s
1999 term in the case of United States v. Morrison, which involved a
challenge to the VAW Act of 1994. The act was designed to address the
escalating problem of violence against women by providing a new avenue
of redress for victims. Recognizing that both the criminal justice system
and the state court civil system often failed fully to compensate victims
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of gender-based violence, Congress provided a new remedy, permitting
victims to sue their attackers in federal court for money damages.
Congress’s remedy came after 4 years of extensive investigation and
voluminous testimony on the extent of violence against women and how
this violence affects women’s economic opportunities. Multiple groups
provided evidence linking commercial activity and violence against
women: employers who lost $3–$5 billion annually through absenteeism
related to domestic violence (U.S. Senate 1990); victims who suffered
from “lost careers, decreased productivity, foregone educational op-
portunities, and long-term health problems” (U.S. Senate 1990, p. 33);
and women in general who faced shrinking employment choices as they
avoided work in unsafe places, late-hour work, or work that required
unsafe public transportation (U.S. Senate 1993).
Despite the voluminous evidence submitted, the Supreme Court, in
a 5-4 decision, invalidated part of the act, holding that “gender-moti-
vated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic
activity” and, hence, cannot be regulated under the Commerce Clause
(Morrison, p. 1751). The Court reasserted its concern that Congress
might use the Commerce Clause “to effectively obliterate the distinction
between what is national and what is local” (p. 1749). To the Court,
letting Congress regulate gender-based violence with civil remedies is a
slippery slope that will lead to the regulation of such traditional areas
of state concern as marriage, divorce, and child rearing. To prevent such
legislation, the Court again distinguished between commerce and non-
commercial activities that might affect commerce.
After nearly 60 years of deferring to Congress’s judgment on which
activities constitute a substantial effect on commerce, the Supreme
Court reasserted its power to override Congress. The Court notes that
the “framers adopted a written Constitution that further divided au-
thority at the federal level [among the judicial, executive and legislative
branch] so that the Constitution would not be defined solely by the
political branches nor the scope of legislative power limited only by
public opinion and the legislature’s self restraint.” Thus the Court has
the final say on the Constitution and the “authority to define [the]
boundary [of the Commerce Clause]” (p. 1753).
In his dissenting opinion on Morrison, which was joined by three other
justices, Justice David Souter objects to the majority’s return to the past
and the disruption of long-standing Commerce Clause analysis. He notes
that before Lopez in 1995, the Supreme Court would have upheld the
act. Why, Souter asks, is it valid to use the Commerce Clause to prohibit
racial discrimination (see Heart of Atlanta and Katzenbach) but not to
provide a remedy for gender-based violence? He notes that “the legis-
lative record here is far more voluminous than the record compiled by
Congress and found sufficient in two prior cases upholding Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act” (Morrison, p. 1763); he also notes that “gender-
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based violence in the 1990s was shown to operate in a manner similar
to racial discrimination in the 1960s in reducing the mobility of em-
ployees and their production and consumption of goods shaped in
interstate commerce. Like racial discrimination, gender-based violence
bars its most likely target—women—from full participation in the na-
tional economy” (p. 1763).
Souter contends that the Supreme Court’s revival of the commercial
and noncommercial distinction and that its higher level of scrutiny is
designed to further its vision of federalism and “does not turn on any
logic serving the text of the Commerce Clause” (p. 1768).5 He reminds
the majority of the judicial crisis that befell the Court when it resorted
to such artificial distinctions during the New Deal. Finally, Souter argues
that growth in federal power is inevitable as the economy grows and
becomes more integrated. This makes it imperative that Congress,
through the political process, be able to resolve economic problems
and conflicts without undue interference by the Court, which does not
have the institutional capacity to make these judgments. The dissenters
argue that the majority’s concern that state sovereignty is somehow at
stake in this process is misplaced. Noting that 36 states filed amicus
briefs in support of the act, Souter writes, it is “not the least irony of
these cases that the states will be forced to enjoy the new federalism
whether they want it or not” (p. 1773).
In sum, both Morrison and Lopez seem to indicate that the Supreme
Court is flexing its muscles. The Court is changing both the definition
of commerce and who gets to delineate the scope of that definition. It
is shrinking its interpretation of the word commerce even while the ten-
tacles of commerce are ever more wrapped around the economic, po-
litical, and social environments. It seems likely that the Court will actively
shape the contours of federalism by subjecting laws passed under the
Commerce Clause to increased scrutiny.
The Consequences of Judicial Federalism
The Supreme Court is not alone in its interest in federalism. In many
ways the Court is merely following the lead of the legislative and ex-
ecutive branches. Virtually every president over the last 30 years has
championed federalism, advocating an increased role for states even
amid growing federal power (Kinkaid 1995). Richard Nixon advocated
revenue sharing, which implied a partnership rather than a hierarchical
relationship between federal and state governments (Gilbert and Terrell
1998). Ronald Reagan advocated the use of block grants to give the
states more flexibility and control over federal funds (Gilbert and Terrell
1998). Bill Clinton, a former governor, was particularly attuned to the
needs of states. Among other examples, his reinventing government
program streamlined funding sources to states and included a sorting-
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out component that more carefully delineated the respective roles of
the federal and state governments (Executive Order 1993).
Congress also has demonstrated a strong interest in federalism. The
104th Congress, and in particular the Republicans’ Contract with Amer-
ica, made devolution one of its defining themes. The result was legis-
lation such as the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Rec-
onciliation Act, which reshaped the social welfare system. Like the
Supreme Court in its recent decisions, Congress reached back to pre-
New Deal days, ending decades of federal centralization and replacing
it with a system that returns to the states, the localities, and even the
private sector a major part of the responsibility for providing public
welfare (Cammisa 1998). In 1995 Congress also passed the Unfunded
Mandate Reform Act, which is designed to protect the states from too
much federal intrusion by requiring Congress, among other things, to
consider the costs to the states of legislation that imposes responsibilities
or duties on state or local governments (Osbourn 1995).
It is not surprising that legislative and executive trends in governing
are mirrored by the judicial branch. Despite the judiciary’s sheen of
independence and impartiality, “the courts are rarely out of sync with
the general tenor of political life for long periods” (Kincaid 1995, p.
915). Courts, and the judges who staff them, are not immune from
public opinion, and their decisions routinely reflect existing cultural
and political mores and attitudes (Cross 1999).6
The Supreme Court then is, in many ways, simply reinforcing and
amplifying political trends in other parts of the body politic. It could
be argued that by reining in Congress’s power with a restrictive inter-
pretation of the Commerce Clause, the Court is enhancing the trend
toward more local and state control. However, the consequences may
be quite different when it is the Court, and not the legislature or the
executive, that is arbitrating the delicate balance between the state and
the federal government.
Understanding why this is so first requires an understanding of the
principles behind federalism, the core of the U.S. system of governing.
Federalism is characterized by a multitiered power-sharing arrangement
between a central authority and parallel, autonomous state governments
(Riker 1964; Beer 1993; Merrill 1998). Such a design recognizes that a
centralized authority is often necessary to unify a nation and to respond
to shared problems while at the same time acknowledging that concen-
trating too much power in any one place can prove dangerous. Fed-
eralism thus acts as a power check, dispersing political power through
various levels of government (Ostrom 1991; Beer 1993; Chemerinsky
1994). At the same time, a central authority can help reduce the fac-
tionalism, competitiveness, and discord characteristic of small, homo-
geneous units of government (Sullivan 1997).
Although federalism as a philosophy is neither conservative nor lib-
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eral, it has historically been associated most often with the former
(Chemerinsky 1994; Cross 1999). States rights was a central argument
used to ward off federal civil rights intervention on behalf of blacks and
other minorities (Kincaid 1995). More recently, states rights is seen by
conservatives as a way to improve government by making it more re-
sponsive to local interests and conditions (Yoo 1998). However, liberals,
too, have at times recognized the value of federalism, especially when
the national government has been dominated by conservatives, as it was
in the 1980s in the Reagan era (Kincaid 1995). It is then that liberals
will often turn to local and state governments to protect their constit-
uencies or advance their policies. Thus whether it is the liberals’ cry for
community empowerment or the conservatives’ lament for states rights,
federalism is a flexible system of governing that allows for shifting power
arrangements.
Beer (1993) identifies three specific values served by federalism: com-
munity, utility, and liberty. Community emphasizes the desirability of
letting individual communities make their own decisions. It encourages
flexibility and experimentation in governing by permitting communities
to mold policies to unique, local characteristics. It can be, therefore, a
way to preserve diversity (Chemerinsky 1994).
Utility emphasizes the practical aspect of federalism (Beer 1993). This
value of federalism looks to what works best: what level of government
can more efficiently and expertly handle the task at hand. Thus, for
example, military defense is better handled by the federal government,
while marriage licenses are issued by the locality. Traditionally in most
federalist systems there is at least some agreement on how power should
be allocated. Commerce among different units within the system, de-
fense and foreign policy, and the monetary system are usually admin-
istered at the federal level, while local and state units of government
are typically given authority over education, cultural issues, and the
family (Merrill 1998).
The third value of federalism is individual liberty (Beer 1993). Ac-
cording to John Yoo (1998), federalism protects liberty in two ways: state
governments could interpose themselves against the federal government
if it began to oppress people, and state governments themselves could
act to extend individual liberties beyond those provided by the national
government. However, other commentators argue that it is the federal
government, and not the states, that is more likely to protect individual
rights (Kincaid 1995; Malloy 1998).
Balancing these three values—community, utility, and individual lib-
erty—is a delicate and subtle task made all the more complicated by
the increasing complexity of modern life. In a world of global markets
is it more efficient for the federal government to extend its reach over
everything economic? Is education still only a matter of local concern
when advances in technology make it a necessity for competing in global
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markets? Are the advantages of local control negated as communities
become defined less by geography than by shared interests or ethnic
identity?
Several commentators argue that answering these questions should
be the job of the political branches, not the judiciary (Stacey 1996; Cross
1999; Kramer 2000). “Because the net effect of federalism’s underlying
values depends on a host of contestable and revisable judgments of
policy and prediction, it is better determined by the trial and error of
the political process” (Stacey 1996, p. 258). According to these com-
mentators, the judiciary does not have the institutional resources to
make these judgments. It cannot hold hearings, weigh testimony, and
negotiate and compromise with different interest groups to decide
where along the continuum of federal and state power the solution lies.
Nor can it properly consider the underlying values served by federalism.
The VAW Act is illustrative of why I believe the Court should hesitate
before substituting its own judgment for that of the legislature. The act
represents a legislative consensus, formed after intensive investigations
and considerable input from individual states, law enforcement agen-
cies, researchers, victims, and others. Legislators determined that gen-
der-based violence infringes on a woman’s basic right to move freely
and safely within society and that it requires a broader-based remedy
than the piecemeal and ineffectual remedies currently available in state
courts. Thus, the federalist values of utility and individual liberty support
an expansion of federal power in this case.
The finality of Supreme Court decisions also mitigates against the
Court too readily invalidating a law supported by a majority of the states.
The Supreme Court is the only branch of government whose power in
such cases is virtually unchecked. Supreme Court justices cannot be
voted out of office and are not held accountable for their decisions in
the same way that the legislature or executive is. While, for example,
the 104th Congress’s Contract with America may be discarded or mod-
ified in the next electoral cycle, the Morrison decision is final. Congress
cannot simply reintroduce the same legislation next year because its
unconstitutionality has been decided. Nor can the states pass laws pro-
viding for a federal civil remedy for gender-based violence; only Con-
gress can. The Supreme Court’s decision will thus stand as a perpetual
barrier to such a remedy despite its broad popular support.
The Morrison decision thus demonstrates how, at times, the Supreme
Court can hamper the machinery of federalism. Federalism requires
fluidity for it to work, with state and federal governments deciding what
level of government can best address a particular problem at a particular
time. Supreme Court decisions are usually more like stone than liquid;
immovable, insurmountable, and resistant to change because of the
institutional value of precedent and the Court’s insularity from political
pressure.
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Thus, when the Supreme Court second-guesses the legislature, as it
did in Morrison, it makes it more difficult for states and the national
government to resolve federalism issues. The ability to move through
different levels of government searching for solutions is essential in a
diverse society; without this process, political paralysis may result, and
experimentation may be hampered (Kincaid 1995). And it is arguably
the political, not the judicial process, that is more conducive to deciding
when joint governmental resources should be deployed or when to label
one problem national and another local. At times the states will be able
to offer a better solution because “states can tailor programs to local
conditions and needs and can act as innovators in creating new pro-
grams” (Yoo 1998, p. 42). At other times it will be the federal government
that can provide the most effective and comprehensive response. In
short, a flexible federalism, forged primarily through the interaction
between the federal and state governments, is likely to be more effective
than judicially ordained solutions.
To be sure, the division of power between the states and the federal
government cannot always be left to the political process. An overreach-
ing federal government left unchecked can stifle the states, preventing
creative and flexible solutions to local problems (Yoo 1998). If too much
power emanates from the federal level, states may become more like
administrative units of the federal government than the autonomous
entities federalism requires. Thus, just as the judiciary protects the in-
fringement of individual rights, it must also protect against the infringe-
ment of states’ autonomy.
However, the Supreme Court’s recent decisions indicate a willingness
to protect the states even when their autonomy is not at stake. The VAW
Act remedy of a federal civil action for individual victims of gender
violence did not impinge on the states’ domain; it only gave to individual
citizens a private remedy they did not have before. And it did so with
the support of the states, as more than two-thirds of states joined with
the federal government in arguing for the VAW Act before the Court.
In sum, while the Supreme Court must play a role in shaping the
balance of power under federalism, its most recent decisions indicate
a willingness to take a more activist role in deciding where that balance
should lie. This increased scrutiny of federal legislation will likely upset
long-standing institutional arrangements between the states and federal
governments (Kramer 2000). As I discuss next, this scrutiny will also
make it more difficult to enact certain legislation on the federal level.
Future Implications
“When the Supreme Court strikes down a law, at least when it does so
in a high-profile case, it does more than merely invalidate a particular
statute. It sends a pulse into the lawmaking process that can have per-
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vasive effects on a wide range of legislation, and it creates a rhetorical
tool that can be used to great effect by ideologically motivated politicians
and legislators” (Kramer 2000, p. 290). That pulse started with Lopez,
with the shock waves increasing after Morrison, although the full effect
of these two decisions will not be known for years to come. Many laws,
from such diverse areas as the environment to child-support enforce-
ment, rely on the Commerce Clause as a basis for federal authority and
are now in question (Kolenc 1998). A specific example is the Child
Support Recovery Act, passed by Congress in 1992 to make the collection
of child support across state lines easier by, among other things, pro-
viding a criminal penalty for parents who fail to pay child support and
who reside in a separate state from their child. While this act appeared
to be surviving after Lopez (Kolenc 1998), it is not faring so well after
Morrison. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held the criminal
provisions of the act to be invalid, finding, consistent with Morrison, that
child support is not a form of commerce but is related to an area—family
law—more properly left to the states (United States v. Faasse 2000).
The Spending Clause of the Constitution, which permits Congress to
spend for the general welfare, does allow the federal government in-
directly to set social policy by attaching conditions to the receipt of
federal funds (Levy 2000).7 The only restriction, established by the Su-
preme Court in South Dakota v. Dole (1987), is that the condition relate
to the purposes of the federal grant. While this power has not been
limited by recent Supreme Court decisions, the Spending Clause is an
inadequate substitute for the Commerce Clause, and at least one com-
mentator has suggested that it may be the next clause to be scrutinized
under the Supreme Court’s new federalism revolution (Levy 2000). Not
all remedies to social problems necessarily require the direct expendi-
ture of federal funds. For example, the civil remedy of permitting
women to sue their attackers in federal court provided under the VAW
Act was not tied to grant of federal monies and, hence, could not have
been enacted under the Spending Clause. The fact that federal funds
must be expended before a particular condition can be required may
also act as a deterrent, especially in the often politically unpopular field
of social welfare.
With no firm anchor for a wide range of civil rights and social welfare
legislation, advocacy efforts on the federal level will be chilled. Statutes
such as the VAW Act require a tremendous amount of energy to propose
and pass; evidence must be gathered, coalitions formed, adversaries
challenged, and legislators lobbied. If the constitutionality of such leg-
islation is in doubt, support from legislators will be much harder to
obtain. This is especially true for legislators who may be wavering in
their support; saying no because of the Constitution is easier than merely
saying no. However, Morrison should be read as a yellow—not a
red—light for federal legislative advocacy. Even in Morrison, the entire
New Judicial Activism 333
VAW Act was not invalidated; the new remedy of criminal penalties for
perpetrators of gender-based violence still exists. Thus, future ap-
proaches may require scaled-down proposals that avoid constitutional
objections rather than no proposals at all.
Beyond the legal lesson, there is another lesson to be learned from
Lopez and Morrison. The justices who formed the majority in Morri-
son—William Rehnquist, Sandra Day O’Connor, Antonin Scalia, An-
thony Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas—were appointed by three con-
servative presidents: Nixon, George Bush, and Reagan. The appointment
of Supreme Court justices is one of the most important legacies left by
a president. But while we are used to scrutinizing the appointment of
justices and the election of presidents on hot-button issues, we are often
less cognizant of their overall judicial philosophy. Unless one of the
more known precedents of the Court, such as Roe v. Wade, appears to
be in danger, the politics of Supreme Court selections often recedes
into the background. This could have serious consequences, especially
in the instant case. How far the Supreme Court will extend its new
interpretation of the Commerce Clause will, in part, be influenced by
future appointments to the Court. Therefore, policy makers and ad-
vocates, including social workers, should familiarize themselves with this
less known judicial doctrine and be ready to educate the public on it
and to interject it into policy debates, especially around election time.
This knowledge can help social workers in other ways as well, primarily
by helping to guide strategies for influencing public policy. If remedial
legislation is needed to combat a specific problem or to protect the
rights of a disenfranchised group, then a determination must be made
whether, given the current composition of the Supreme Court, it is likely
to pass constitutional muster. If not, state and local legislatures and
other regional institutions must become the focus of advocacy efforts.
The current political trend of devolution has already made involvement
in state and local politics a necessity (Reisch 2000). The judicial trend
in the same direction requires a similar response.
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Notes
1. In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents (2000) the Supreme Court held that a federal law
prohibiting discrimination against the aged in employment (the ADEA) is not applicable
to state governments. Similarly, in Alden v. Maine (1999), the Court held that Maine could
not be sued in state court for violating the Fair Labor Standards Act. In Board of Trustees
of the University of Alabama v. Garrett (2001), the Court held that state employees cannot
sue for damages for violations of the American with Disabilities Act. All three decisions
were based on a broad interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, which prohibits lawsuits
against a state without its consent. In Printz v. United States (1997), the Court struck down
the Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act (1993) on the ground that Congress could
not use state officials to enforce federal laws. This act required state and local law en-
forcement officials to conduct background checks before issuing permits for firearms.
The Court found that commandeering state officials to enforce federal law violated the
Tenth Amendment, which reserves all powers not delegated to the federal government
to the states. In City of Boerne v. Flores (1997), the Court invalidated the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act(1993), a federal law that limited a state’s ability to pass laws that burdened
an individual’s ability to exercise his or her religion. The Court based its decision on the
Fourteenth Amendment (explained in n. 3 below), holding that it could not be used to
create new rights.
2. The Commerce Clause states: “The Congress shall have the power to… regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes”
(U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8 [3]).
3. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
4. The highest standard of review, strict scrutiny, requires the state to show a compelling
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reason for its actions and indicate that its choice results in the least amount of interference
with individual rights. In contrast, the rational basis test requires only that the state have
a legitimate legislative purpose and that the means chosen are not the best or even the
most effective, but rational (Nowak and Rotunda 1995).
5. A study by Frank Cross and Emerson Tiller (2000) of every Supreme Court decision
on federalism between 1985 and 1997 finds that the Court was more likely to rule against
a liberal than a conservative plaintiff who argued for broad federal powers. Perhaps a
conservative outcome sometimes supplants the uniform application of the principles of
federalism.
6. Court decisions often reveal societal attitudes during a particular time period. For
example, in Bradwell v. Illinois (1872), the Supreme Court prohibited women from prac-
ticing law, stating that, “Man is or should be women’s protector and defender. The par-
amount destiny and mission of women are to fulfill the noble and benign office of wife
and mother.” Such culturally infused language underscores the fact that the judiciary can
be permeated with ideology. Examples can be found in more modern cases as well.
7. For example, states that receive federal funds for welfare programs such as Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families are required also to set up procedures for the collection of
child support. States that receive highway funds are required to set a minimum drinking
age of 21.
